[easyazon_image add_to_cart=”default” align=”left” asin=”B00PAXBAAG” cloaking=”default” height=”333″ localization=”default” locale=”US” nofollow=”default” new_window=”default” src=”http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41NXlu7zHnL.jpg” tag=”douloschristo-20″ width=”220″]Discerning Meaning Through Experience
A Review of
Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception
John Searle
Hardback: Oxford UP, 2015
Buy now: [ [easyazon_link asin=”0199385157″ locale=”US” new_window=”default” nofollow=”default” tag=”douloschristo-20″ add_to_cart=”default” cloaking=”default” localization=”default” popups=”default”]Amazon[/easyazon_link] ] [ [easyazon_link asin=”B00PAXBAAG” locale=”US” new_window=”default” nofollow=”default” tag=”douloschristo-20″ add_to_cart=”default” cloaking=”default” localization=”default” popups=”default”]Kindle[/easyazon_link] ]
Reviewed by Tyler Campbell
John Searle has taught philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley since 1959, and is the winner of several prestigious awards within the humanities. His curriculum vitae is extensive, and features robust works ranging in topics from speech, political commentary, the philosophy of language, logic, social reality, and consciousness. Throughout his career, Searle has always been an entertaining read not only for the subject matter that he works with, but for the ways in which he goes about engaging these topics. The tone in his writing is at all times confident, procedural, and steeped within the history of philosophy. However, aided by the topics he most frequently engages, the examples and justifications for his arguments are frequently overwhelmingly human. Often times it is precisely at the moment when the reader begins feeling perplexed that Searle employs the example of his furniture, dog, or the scene from his window to help explain his point. His latest book, Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception, finds its foundations in this sort of allegorical mastery. Through this, Searle creates a highly technical account of the intentionality of our perceived experiences; pushing the reader to think more acutely of how their brains process the things they interact with in their daily lives.
Searle begins his project with a lengthy first chapter, followed by two separate appendices. The appendices serve as review for the Theory of Intentionality and Consciousness, two topics that Searle has written about at length elsewhere. More importantly, these first fifty pages exist to create the foundations of what Searle refers to as the “Bad Argument”, a subject that becomes of paramount importance throughout the rest of the book. Searle writes that the Bad Argument “is an instance of a very general fallacy about intentionality, and it results from confusion about the very nature of intentionality”, going on to write that the confusion is between the content and object of an intentional state (27). The Bad Argument contends that the way we experience the world is, in reality, a hallucination that is indistinguishable from a veridical, precise experience. Therefore, the perceived hallucination, as well as the veridical must both consists of “sense data”, or unanalyzed experiences inside the mind. Searle is dramatic with his language, suggesting that the Bad Argument has tainted the philosophical study of epistemology since the 17th century. Even negatively limiting the ways in which the supposed “great” western philosophers can engage with an ontologically objective world.
The ultimate place Searle takes the books argument is a defense of Direct Realism, suggesting the senses we experience work to present the actual world to us rather than a perceived experience. The footwork of this argument is seen in the middle portion of the book which, when not showing the weaknesses of the Bad Argument, focuses its attention on the ways in which intentionality works within perception. At its core, perception has an intentional nature that is unencumbered by sense data, and is instead focused on the objective events that cause our perceptions. An issue that arises is the limitations in language in describing our perceived experiences. Searle highlights that the same words are used to describe both our visual experience and the object we are seeing. This shared language causes us to believe that the object, or a presentation of that object causes our experience.
This debate about the authenticity of what causes perceptions leads to the climax of the book, where Searle engages the theory of Disjunctivism. This theory of visual experience rejects the presence of sense data in certain cases. Suggesting that the mental states involved in a “good case” occurrence of veridical perception and a “bad case” hallucination differ even when it is indistinguishable to the person. A Disjunctivist would suggest that a veridical experience and a hallucination share no common components. Or as Searle writes, “a common feature that runs through Disjunctivism, and which I think can be used to define the notion, is that there is no common conscious experience that occurs in both the good and the bad cases” (165). For Searle, everything we imagine or believe gives rise to an intrinsic feeling of what it is like to do or think this thing, which is supported in his earlier thoughts on intentionality. Opposing Disjunctivism, Searle contends that there is no difference in the subjective character of veridical experiences and hallucination. Although their “subjective ontology” has no difference, Searle does argue that there exists a difference within these experiences intentional character. The main difference is that while veridical perceptions are about objects and ideas human beings come into contact within the world, hallucinations are actually about nothing at all. Again reiterating that our perception is rooted in objective events we experience.
The final two chapters shift away from the problems of conscious perceptions and instead focus on the unconscious. After establishing that the study of consciousness has lost its importance for today’s philosophers, Searle concludes that there is no such thing as the “deep unconscious”. Suggesting that there is no deeper level that manipulates our perceptions. This deduction sets up the final chapter of the project, which engages classical theories of perception and the ways Phenomenalism and Representative Theory have contributed to the Bad Argument. Searle suggests that the difficulty with the Bad Argument is not only that it gives an incorrect account of perception, but also that it limits our ability to ask the most important questions about the topic. The main question Searle is referring to asks how it is that the specific features of the perceptual experience determine the conditions of satisfaction that they do? (231).
Searle’s book is a wonderful addition to the philosophical discipline of perception, and a useful way for someone who is not well versed in the subject to receive and extensive overview of the historical arguments. The overarching thesis is a strong defense of Direct Realism that will inspire the reader to contemplate the ways they discern meaning through experience.
C. Christopher Smith is the founding editor of The Englewood Review of Books. He is also author of a number of books, including most recently How the Body of Christ Talks: Recovering the Practice of Conversation in the Church (Brazos Press, 2019). Connect with him online at: C-Christopher-Smith.com
 Reading for the Common Good From ERB Editor Christopher Smith "This book will inspire, motivate and challenge anyone who cares a whit about the written word, the world of ideas, the shape of our communities and the life of the church." -Karen Swallow Prior Enter your email below to sign up for our weekly newsletter & download your FREE copy of this ebook! |
Understanding Christian Nationalism [A Reading Guide] |
 Most Anticipated Books of the Fall for Christian Readers!
|
 Hilarious One-Star Customer Reviews of Bibles |
